Permits, standards, and technology innovation

I compare environmental R&D incentives offered by four policy instruments - emission
standards, performance standards, tradeable permits, and auctioned permits - in the presence
of oligopoly permits and output markets. Because R&D incentives depend on direct and
strategic effects, standards can offer greater incentives than do permits. If markets are perfectly
competitive, however, tradeable and auctioned permits provide equal incentives that are
similar to those offered by emission standards and greater than those offered by performance
standards.

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URL (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Keywords:

Oligopoly markets, Standards, Technology innovation, Tradeable permits

Additional information:

Language(s):English
AuthorsMontero, Juan Pablo (Catholic University of Chile; and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA)
Publisher:Elsevier Science (USA)
Keywords:Oligopoly markets, Standards, Technology innovation, Tradeable permits